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ABSTRACT 
 
THE RISE OF MONEY: AN EVOLUTIONARY  
ANALYSIS OF THE ORIGINS OF MONEY 
Tahmilci, Ahmet 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assis. Prof. Kevin Hasker 
 
September 2006 
 
 
 This paper shows that if there are more goods than money in all trading 
periods then nonconvertible fiat money is evolutionarily successful in complex 
economies. This result is developed in Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) search model of 
money, using a learning algorithm developed by Marimon et. al (1990). When we 
include an evolutionary model similar to Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) we find 
that fiat money is frequently evolutionarily successful. To be precise let x be the 
probability someone finds someone who has a good they want –small x represents a 
complex economy– and let µ be the fraction of people holding money in any trading 
period. As long as  µ < fiat money will be evolutionarily successful. 
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ÖZET 
 
PARANIN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞI: PARANIN KÖKENİNE  
İLİŞKİN EVRİMSEL BİR ANALİZ 
Tahmilci, Ahmet 
Master, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doc. Dr. Kevin Hasker 
 
 
Eylül 2006 
 
  Bu  çalışma,  eğer ortamda sirkülasyondaki paradan fazla tüketim maddesi 
var ise, bu şartlar altında gelişmiş ekonomilerde geri dönüşümü olmayan kağıt 
paranın evrimsel olarak başarılı bir şekilde ortaya çıktığını göstermektedir. Bu sonuç 
Kiyotaki ve Wright (1993)’ın para araştırma teorisi modelinin Marimon et. al (1990) 
da kullanılan öğrenme algoritması kullanılarak değiştirilmesi ile oluşturulan model 
üzerinde gösterilmiştir. Bu modele Kandori, Mailath, ve Rob (1993)’ un 
modelindekine benzer bir evrimsel model adapte edilmesiyle kağıt paranın evrimsel 
olarak başarılı bir şekilde ortaya çıktığını gördük. Modeli eksiksiz bir şekilde 
kurmak için  x  istediği tüketim malzemesini ekonomideki bir başkasında bulma 
ihtimali – küçük x ekonominin kompleks olduğunu  göstermektedir-  ve µ 
ekonomide herhangi bir periodda parayı kullanan insan sayısı olarak  kabul  edelirse,  
kağıt para µ <  koşulu sağlandığı sürece evrimsel olarak başarılı bir şekilde 
ortaya çıkacaktır. 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kağıt Para, Öğrenme, Stokastik Evrim 
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CHAPTER 1 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Why do people exchange intrinsically worthless paper money for valuable 
goods? How money became the basic exchange tool in the market? It has long been 
studied why money is Pareto superior to barter but how did economies make the 
transition? Money as a medium has evolved through the very essence of what it has 
created, a desire to specialize, to compete in its market and to advance, but it is also a 
consequence of the specialization of market. Namely, this is a cyclic process: 
specialization leads to money and money leads to specialization; and in this paper, we 
argue inception was initiated by specialization of the market. Kiyotaki and Wright 
(1993) developed an elegant analytical model that has both barter exchange and 
monetary exchange equilibria, but this model can not explain the transition between the 
 2 
two. Money is money since society perceives it as valuable1 and if people think money 
is valuable then they will use money. In this paper, we are trying to answer the question 
how the transition occurs, and the transition dynamics from the barter equilibrium to the 
monetary equilibrium via a learning based game-theoretic model is the main emphasis 
of this paper. 
 
To develop a model of how society switches between these two viable equilibria 
we need to have a model of how people behave out of equilibrium. One that has 
recently been subjected to analysis in the microeconomics literature is the model of 
stochastic evolution---first developed by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young 
(1993). When we apply this general model to the evolution of money it implies that 
people occasionally try out money, and once enough people have decided to use fiat 
money others are slowly convinced that it is best, until in the end it is the primary 
mechanism of trade. We show that this transition occurs surprisingly frequently. As 
long as there are more real goods than fiat money produced in each trading period then 
in complex economies fiat money is evolutionarily dominant (or stochastically stable in 
the terminology of the literature.) 
 
We have to modify the basic model of evolution because using money is an 
equilibrium in a dynamic game---one accepts money today so one can buy things 
tomorrow. Out of equilibrium the calculation of continuation values is very 
complicated, so we use a feedback learning algorithm developed by Marimon, 
McGratten, and Sargent (1990). We modify this algorithm and show that people using 
                     
1
 Iwai (2001) calls this as bootstrap nature of money. 
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the modified feedback-learning algorithm are able to learn in a wide variety of 
environments. With the basic algorithm Lettau and Uhlig (1999) show people may 
falsely learn a sub-optimal strategy to be superior to the optimal rule. In our model 
people always learn the optimal strategy from interaction and positive feedback and this 
allows us to predict which strategy will survive the evolutionary process. Thus 
independent of the initial beliefs, agents learn the value of money and beliefs converge 
to the true values of the infinite horizon optimization problem. Hence, in our model 
agents learn the equilibrium path from interaction and positive feedback. 
 
However notice that our learning rule will be history dependent. Thus people 
should be aware that their current beliefs might sometimes be wrong, and we consider 
agents who sometimes try out new beliefs; this is what we called modified algorithm. 
This transforms the interaction into one of dynamic evolution. With these perturbations 
in the system agents switch back and forth between the barter and fiat money 
equilibrium. The switches to the evolutionarily dominant strategy will be more 
frequently---infinitely more frequent as the probability of trying out new beliefs goes to 
zero---and this allows us to make a unique long run prediction. 
 
Further, our feedback learning model is a different approach to stochastic 
evolution literature, it allows us to consider just the last key assumptions of the classic 
evolutionary model and other two assumptions are naturally satisfied by our model. As 
developed by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), stochastic evolution makes three 
behavioral assumptions: inertia, myopia, and mutations. Inertia means that not all agents 
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change their strategy in every period, and in our model this happens naturally since 
agents' beliefs change based on the classifier-strength system which is updated every 
period. Myopia means that one chooses the action that is optimal given the current 
distribution of the population, and our learning model explicitly explains how beliefs 
are formed and then replaces this with just choosing the optimal action given one's 
beliefs. The only element of their model that we directly adopt is mutations. Mutations 
mean that very rarely people change their strategy at random, in our model people 
develop radical new guesses about the continuation values. 
 
As noted above, people may have wrong beliefs about their current state and we 
allow simple experiments are necessary for learning. In our model, for example, if 
someone does not occasionally experiment with trading he could believe that not trading 
is always best. We handle this type of simple experiment by having people occasionally 
take the wrong actions. 
 
If we look at the literature of search-theory of money we see that the majority of 
the traditional literature has been focused on explaining why money is Pareto Superior 
to barter. One common conclusion of this literature is that a primary benefit of money is 
in overcoming the famed double coincidence of wants---an insight first developed by 
Jevons (1875). In a barter economy by the general matching rule you must both find 
someone who wants what you have and has what you want, while in a monetary 
economy you only need to find someone who has what you want. This insight has been 
used in a spate of recent papers that try to explain the transition from a barter economy 
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to a monetary economy. Most of these papers use variations of the model developed by 
Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). For example in Ritter (1995) the money stock in the 
market is not pre-determined, rather the money issuing incentive can optimally 
introduce its currency and the stock in the market. However since that is an equilibrium 
analysis it has to assume people are willing to use money. This type of analysis can not 
explain how people learn to trust money. There are some other variations of the basic 
model such as Zhou and Green (2002) allow for a finite life time; Williamson and 
Wright(1994) allows for divisible money and goods; and Kehoe, Kiyotaki, and Wright 
(1991) allow for the possibility of private information. However, these modifications do 
not address the fundamental deficiency of needing people to believe that money is good 
before they accept it. 
 
There is a strain of this literature that analyzes what occurs under various 
learning dynamics. The seminal paper on learning is Marimon, McGratten, and Sargent 
(1990); and others modify that model to improve on those results. For example Basci 
(1999) in his learning model based on Kehoe, Kiyotaki, and Wright (1991) includes 
learning from neighbors and shows people learn more quickly. Other papers use simpler 
learning algorithms and focus more on the evolutionary aspect of the analysis. Iwai 
(2001) uses a ``bootstrap'' argument to explain when commodity and fiat money can 
arise. Wright (1999)  uses an evolutionary argument to show that barter and fiat money 
cannot co-exist as methods of exchange. Wright (1995) shows that the commodity with 
the lowest storage cost will naturally become commodity money. Selgin (2003) shows 
that even if fiat money is possible when they start out using barter, learning procedure 
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leads the good with the lowest storage cost to emerge as commodity money. These 
articles emphasize our key point. We have to look at models where agents occasionally 
conduct ``grand experiments.'' Only by analyzing this type of model can we hope to 
discover whether people will learn to trust money.  
 
In the next section we introduce the model in three parts. First we introduce the 
basic interaction, then our model of learning, and then our model of evolution. The rest 
of the paper mimics this three step presentation. First we find the steady state equilibria 
of the model in chapter 3. Then we show that our learning algorithm will work, and 
show that this means society will learn in chapter 4. Finally we show which strategy 
will be stochastically stable (or evolutionarily dominant) in section 5. We then 
conclude. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
MODEL 
 
 
2.1 The Model of Trading 
 
Let us consider a world with I infinitely lived agents (I should be even and large) 
with heterogenous abilities and needs. There are n consumption goods which are 
indivisible. Each individual is endowed with a fixed ability to produce one of n goods 
and a fixed need to consume another one of n goods. Assume that each period everyone 
is endowed with one unit of a good that they can not consume, thus they must trade. 
This good is neither durable nor divisible, thus it must be either traded for a unit of 
consumption good or wasted. Next period each agent will be endowed with a unit of 
consumption good again. 
 
In the economy, the essential problem is that when people want to barter they 
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must find someone who wants what they have (call this event a) and has what they want 
(call this event b), while if they use money they only have to find someone who has 
what they want (event b). Let the probability of each of these events be x (<1) then 
barter occurs with probability x2; money trading with probability x. Since x> x2 there is 
a utility of money. 
 
We will change the endowment of some agents to one unit of fiat money (a 
fraction µ =i/I, i Є{ 4,6,8,...I-4}. This good is not consumable but it is durable, enabling 
trade across periods. It is also a substitute for barter, thus someone with a unit of money 
will never be endowed with a unit of consumption good. Now we have a model where 
agents can trade either using barter or fiat money. 
 
Agents will be matched with each other by equal likelihood, and when two 
agents {i,j} are matched there are nine possible situations. Player i can have what j 
wants, call this cj; or i can not have what j wants, call this c-j; or i can have money, 
denoted m. Likewise agent j can have what i wants---ci, have a good i does not want---c-
i, or be endowed with money m. This means that the nine states of the world, called as 
state space, are Ω = {cj, c−j,m} × {cj, c−j,m}. 
 
Each period, after matching occurs agents decide whether to trade (T) or not (N) 
based on trading partner's endowment. We denote the action set of the trading partners 
as Ai=Aj={ T,N} , and A= AixAj. If both choose to trade then the exchange takes place, 
otherwise it does not.  
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If person i trades for a unit of ci then he gets utility U>0, if he trades for a unit of 
c-i then he incurs a transaction cost of  к>0, if he trades for a unit of money he gets no 
utility but does not incur a transaction cost.2 Next period (which is discounted with a 
factor of β Є (0,1) someone with money can trade for a unit of consumption good. 
Notice that this means that the interaction is dynamic, the value of money today 
depends on what occurs next period. 
 
We would like to specifically mention the two simplifications in this model that 
make it the most divorced from reality. First of all there is no central agency that issues 
the fiat money and controls the quantity of money. This allows us to ignore the 
incentives of the central agency that is issuing the fiat money and the issue of 
seignorage. For an article that addresses these issues one can refer to Ritter (1995). His 
key result is that the body issuing the fiat money has to represent a large enough fraction 
of the population using the money for there to be a fiat money equilibrium. There is also 
no price level since goods and money are not divisible. 
 
2.2 The Model of Learning 
 
An important problem in economics and other areas of science is finding the 
mathematical relationship between the empirically observed variables measuring a 
system. Especially, in a dynamic interaction the calculation of returns is extremely 
                     
2
 If к=0 then our results are simpler without changing in any significant way. We will note the changes 
this would cause below. In our analysis we will make the traditional assumption that к>0. 
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difficult. In a steady state it is relatively simple but our model will usually not be in 
steady state, since we are trying to look at the out of equilibrium behavior of the 
economy. Out of steady state, one must estimate the path of motion of the economy, 
which requires estimating the other individuals' decisions, and then calculate the 
optimal strategy. Notice that in order to estimate other individuals' decisions one must 
calculate their beliefs about the path of motion of the economy. 
 
Related to the issue of finding the equilibrium path of the economy, genetic 
algorithms provide a better assistance as equilibrium selection devices in the models 
with multiple equilibria and the examination of transitional dynamics that accompanies 
the equilibrium selection process. As some applications show, these algorithms can also 
be used as models of individual learning where evolution takes place on a set of 
competing beliefs of an individual agents. If the objective of research is the examination 
of strategic interactions in game-theoretic framework, then individual learning is a more 
appropriate paradigm. Techniques similar to those used in evolutionary game theory 
could be used in some of the models to examine the local stability of equilibria under 
the evolutionary dynamics. In addition, the analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the 
simplified versions of models can improve our understanding of simulations and 
provide support for the observed behavior. These algorithms impose low requirement on 
the computational ability of economic agents. (Arifovic (2000)) 
 
One model developed by Marimon, McGratten, and Sargent (1990) and Lettau 
and Uhlig (1999) does have the features described above and could be a good starting 
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point for our model. In this model, people begin with guesses of what the value of 
various strategies is, and then use an explicit ad-hoc learning algorithm to find the true 
values. 
 
While this type of model has only recently been analyzed in economics we 
should mention that it has a long history in other literatures. One of the ground breaking 
works in this field was Chris Watkins' dissertation in Psychology (1989). We should 
note that our model is consistent with two well-known facts from psychological learning 
literature, called ''Law of Effect'' and ''Power Law of Practice''. ''Law Of Effect'' says 
that choices that have good outcomes in the past are more likely repeated in the future, 
and in our model by the classifier-strength system good outcomes in the past favors the 
same outcome in the future by the positive feedback to the belief of the value for that 
outcome. Second, ''Power Law of Practice'' states that the slope of learning curve is 
decreasing in time, and in our model this assumption is satisfied easily by the concave 
learning curve. 
 
As well Computer Scientists have longed analyzed models in this class; see 
Barto, Bradtke, and Singh (1995) for a review of this literature and some new results. 
Notice that the Psychologists are seeking a reasonable model for human behavior while 
the Computer Scientists are seeking the most efficient learning algorithm. Despite these 
divergent goals they both have analyzed the type of model we consider here. 
 
In this model each person begins with an initial belief (called a strength) of the 
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value of an action pair α ЄA at the state ω Є Ω. We denote the strength at time t, Stαω, 
and the column vector of these strengths as St (for initial strength the column vector is 
S0). Each period this person observes the state of the world and using St choose the 
action with the highest expected strength. Then he updates the strength of the state that 
actually occurs. Let τ Є( 0,1) be the weight they put on their old strength, and Uαω be 
the instantaneous payoff from the action pair α at the state ω, then: 
St+1αω=(1-τ) Stαω+τ(U αω+βM tαωSt) 
otherwise St+1α’ω’= Stα’ω’. The row vector Mtαω  is the Markov transition probabilities in 
period t given { α, ω}. These transition probabilities will be a function of the 
distribution of strategies from last period, this agent's strategy, and experiments 
(discussed below.) 
 
There are several differences between this model and the general model in 
Lettau and Uhlig (1999). These differences are primarily motivated by a desire to be 
certain agents can learn. We argue that this is a type of ``long run rationality.'' Clearly in 
the short run agents will make mistakes because they have the wrong priors, however if 
they also are making mistakes in the long run this suggests not only are their priors 
wrong but their model of the interaction is wrong. Most of the changes we make to the 
model are motivated by this difference. 
 
The first of the changes we make to the model is that like Basci (1999) we have 
one strength for each action/state pair and thus our agents choose an optimal action at 
each state instead of optimal strategies. Notice that optimal strategies are made up of 
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optimal actions at each state, thus in our model if St-1αω is correct and the distribution of 
strategies is not changing, agents will choose the optimal strategy. If we instead had 
them choosing strategies then either we rule out a-priori players using certain strategies 
or we have a model which is equivalent to the one here. Since ruling out strategies a-
priori is anathema to unbiased analysis we favor the simpler model. Our assumption that 
they have a different strength depending on the action of their opponent is made for 
technical convenience. 
 
The second difference is that we assume agents experiment---there is some fixed 
εex>0 that they choose the wrong action at every state. As Watkins (1989) shows this 
enables learning because every state is reached with positive probability. Without this 
assumption an agent could reach silly conclusions like never trading is optimal.(Note 
that Lettau and Uhlig (1999) calls this ''good state bias'') All results in this paper will be 
for small εex. 
 
Two final changes are dictated by the environment we are analyzing. In 
Marimon et al.(1990) the update factor (τ) is decreasing over time. As Benveniste, 
Metivier, and Priouret (1987) point out this is only sensible if the optimal strategy 
cannot change over time. In our model there are multiple equilibria and thus the optimal 
strategy can change. If τ→0 this means that agents are ignoring new information, and 
thus the agents might be making worse and worse decisions as time goes by. 
 
However this last change makes our model unstable and must be compensated 
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for by another change. In the standard model Mt
 
is just what happened to agent i in 
period t. This is one reason that they assume that τ→0, without this assumption the 
model may never converge. Thus we assume that Mt is based on the population 
distribution of strategies from last period. We are fairly certain our results would hold if 
Mt was based on a partial sample (similar to Young (1993)) but are certain our results 
fail if it is based only on personal experience. 
 
We want to allow for very general priors on the strengths, all we require is that 
they are drawn from a compact and continuous support that includes all feasible 
payoffs, or that any S0 ∈ [-κ/(1-β), U/(1-β)]|A||Ω|  is possible. 
 
2.3 The Model Evolution 
 
When we add one refinement to our model of learning it will be a model of 
stochastic evolution. We will assume that with probability εm >0 people mutate, or draw 
St-1 from the initial distribution. We can justify this as checking to make sure if your 
historic beliefs are correct (one should consider low τ) but we notice that this addition to 
the model completely changes results. Because of this society will not settle down at 
any particular state. Instead society will constantly adopt new strategies. However as 
εm→0 society will spend most of their time around a particular state, some situation 
where everyone is best responding to the current distribution of strategies. This will 
mean that society is spending most of it's times near limit sets. 
Definition 1: A limit set is a set of distributions of strategies such that: 
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1. Any distribution of strategies in the limit set can be reached from any 
other without mutations. 
2. Any distribution of strategies that is not in the limit set can only be 
reached via mutations. 
 
Intuitively this is a ``best response cycle.'' i.e. if the distribution of strategies is 
currently at one distribution in the limit set, and everyone best responds to that then the 
distribution of strategies is at another. Clearly any Nash equilibrium is a limit set, but 
there might be others. In this interaction, however, there will not be. 
 
We will be interested in the system when is εm very small. As εm →0 the relative 
likelihood of any other event dwarfs the likelihood of a mutation. Thus the number of 
mutations needed to transition from one limit set to another will completely determine 
how likely the transition is. Here this will be some fraction, η, of the population, and for 
given I we will need mutations.3 This dependency on I will be unimportant for 
the analysis, and we will say that a fraction η of the population must mutate. 
 
The only transition that will matter in this paper is the transition that takes the 
least mutations, this transition determines the radius. 
 
Definition 2: The radius of a limit set pi is the least fraction of the population that must 
change their strategy before in the long run a player can not use a strategy in pi, we 
                     
3
 For a real number x, is the smallest integer which is larger than x, and  is the largest integer that 
is smaller. 
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denote this r∗(pi). 
 
Intuitively the reader might find it easier to think of the radius as a ``security 
level.'' In this interaction if fewer than this fraction stop using a strategy in the limit set 
then it can be ignored. A person can be secure that they are using the right strategy 
without qualification. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 
THE STEADY STATE EQUILIBRIA 
 
 
In this section we will ignore the model of learning and evolution for a while, 
and focus on the steady state equilibria of the underlying game. In order to carefully 
analyze learning and out of equilibrium behavior we need a simple method of 
representing every possible strategy. One method is to list the states at which this 
strategy trades. Then, for example, the always trade strategy is:  
 
and the never trade strategy is NT={∅}. 
 
Notice that NT is an equilibrium when εex =0, and even worse it is a steady state 
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of the learning algorithm if εex =0. If one starts out with the beliefs that not trading is 
optimal then one will never have any experience that will change one's mind(Lettau and 
Uhlig (1999) calls this ''good state bias''). This is an example of why experimentation is 
important, and for all εex>0 this strategy is strictly dominated. 
 
Lemma 1:  Trading for ci is a dominant action. So is not trading at the state { cj,c-i} 
and { c
-j,c-i}. 
Proof: See the appendix on page 37. 
 
This pins down an optimal strategy at five of the nine states of the world. 
Furthermore the strategy at {m,m}  does not affect payoffs so we will ignore it.4 This 
leaves only three states left to specify a strategy at: {cj,m}, {c-j,m}, and {m,c-i}. The 
important steady state equilibria each trade at a subset of these states. These are: 
 
B is a barter strategy, if you are using this strategy and holding money you will take 
anything to get rid of it. F is the fiat money trading strategy, in this strategy you will 
trade anything in order to hold money. Notice that everyone barters if it is feasible, one 
always is willing to trade for ci. 
 
If agents make mistakes too frequently, or β is too low, then trading for c-i when 
holding money might never be optimal. In this case instead of the B strategy everyone 
                     
4
 Notice that if к=0 then whether people trades at { cj,c-i} and { c-j,c-i} could also be ignored as irrelevant. 
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will use the B~ strategy: 
 
 
When we call something an ``equilibrium'' we mean it is a Nash equilibrium, but 
notice that since people make mistakes with strictly positive probability this is also a 
Subgame Perfect equilibrium and a Sequential equilibrium. Furthermore, since people 
base their decisions on strengths it is probability zero that they will be indifferent 
between actions, thus we assume people use pure strategies.5 When we call a strategy a 
``pure population equilibrium'' we mean that everyone in the population is using the 
same pure strategy. When we call a strategy ``mixed population equilibrium'' this means 
that some people are using different pure strategies. 
 
In order to characterize the equilibria we need to calculate the continuation 
values of holding a consumption good c or money m. 
 
Lemma 2: (Charachterization) The continuation values from holding money and a 
consumption good are: 
 
where Pg ( s) is the probability of trading for good g Є { ci,c-i,m } when holding sЄ{c,m} 
                     
5
 If an agent is indifferent assume that he will trade. 
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and .  
Proof: One can easily calculate that the flow values of these states are: 
 
and after algebraic manipulation these can be turned into the continuation values 
above. 
 
With this result we can quickly find the pure population equilibria. 
 
Lemma 3: F and B are the pure population equilibria unless agents are impatient or 
experiment a lot. If β< or εex >ε*ex then B~ is an equilibrium instead of 
B. 
Proof: See the appendix on page 38. 
 
Note that as we mention above if people experiment a lot or people discount 
feature beliefs too much, trading for c
-i  is never optimal. As a result, B~  is an 
equilibrium in stead of B. 
 
In the rest of the paper we will assume that B is the pure population barter 
equilibrium without loss of generality, indeed our proofs would be easier if trading at { 
m, c
-i } were never a best response. 
 
Quite interestingly there is a continuum of mixed population equilibria, and in 
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none of them do agents use the strategy B. The reason for this is that B trades at the state 
{m, c
-i} because the value of holding money is so low that the cost of к is worth the 
benefit of holding a consumption good. In a mixed population equilibrium the value of 
holding money is higher, and thus it is not a good idea to trade money for c
-i. There is a 
continuum of mixed population equilibria because in such an equilibrium agents are 
indifferent between using the strategy F and F~:  
 
but the value of holding money is decreasing the more people use the strategy F, and 
thus for each mixture we have a different equilibrium. 
 
Notice that agents might also use strategies other than B~, F and F~  in a mixed 
population equilibrium. We might, for example, have some people who only trade for 
money when holding c
-j. Thus the entire space of equilibria is complicated, and not 
worth specifying. The only important equilibria in our analysis are the extremes, where 
all agents who trade for money are using either the strategies F or F~. Let pim (f) be the 
fraction of the people holding money who use strategy f Є{ F, F~} and pic (f) be the 
equivalent portion holding the consumption good. 
 
Lemma 4: The extreme mixed population equilibria are 
, pim (f)=1-om(εex f) where and 
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Proof: See the appendix on page 39. 
 
 
Notice two interesting facts about these equilibria. First, as Wright (1999) show 
the mixed population equilibrium requires more people to be using money than a mixed 
strategy equilibrium. In a mixed strategy equilibrium anyone will trade for money thus 
pim (f)≈ pic (f), while in a mixed population equilibria essentially everyone who is holding 
money will be using a fiat money strategy. Secondly notice these equilibria are not 
stable, if in any period less than pic (f) fiat money traders are in the consumption state a 
barter strategy is a strict best response. Finally notice that the equilibrium condition 
depends only on pic (f). In fact (as we will have to assume later) they could have 
incorrect beliefs about pim (f) and as long as pic (f) is at it’s critical value this will be 
sufficient.6 
 
 
 
                     
6
 This is the final point where к=0 has a real impact on our analysis. \ One can check that if к=0 then       
oc( εex| F~) = oc( εex| F~) =0 thus all of the equilibria are the same and independent of εex.  Furthermore 
clearly the choice between B and B~ would be irrelevant. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
LEARNING 
 
 
In this section we will specify the steady states of our learning algorithm. The 
first proposition merely establishes that we have met our criteria of ``long run 
rationality'': agents can learn. If this result did not hold then we would argue that we had 
misspecified the learning algorithm. The second proposition is not a result we assumed 
a priori, this proposition shows that the population can learn simultaneously. The results 
of the first proposition we are certain work in very general environments since our 
learning algorithm is similar to a Gauss-Seidel learning algorithm, the results of the 
second proposition may not hold in all games. 
 
One key decision we have to make at this point is what information people will 
have about the current distribution of strategies and how they should interpret this 
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information. One option is to have them know the distribution of strategies dependent 
on whether people are holding money or not. This would be the most information we 
could assume they have, and we argue it is too much. While explicitly they will know 
the distribution in each period implicitly we wish the distribution to represent some 
general information they have gathered. This information might be old and not 
completely trustworthy. Thus they should not be able to deduce exactly how many 
people are using a certain strategy today, and whether those people are holding a 
consumption good or money. Furthermore is it reasonable to assume they know the 
distribution over strategies? A strategy is not directly observable, it requires many 
observations of a person to know his entire strategy. Thus we will only let them know 
the fraction of people who trade in each state, η={ ηω}ωЄΩ. 
 
This assumption, however, presents us with some secondary issues. These issues 
will not strongly affect analysis but must be addressed. Given the distribution of actions 
what are agents' beliefs about the distribution of strategies? The simplest assumption 
would be that the two distributions are independent, but these beliefs would be wrong 
any time society is not in equilibrium, or the beliefs fail a ``reasonability'' test. We 
notice that our learning algorithm induces a correlation between actions, and we assume 
that agents understand this correlation. This leads us to four simple conclusions. First if 
an agent is taking one dominant action then they are taking all dominant actions. If they 
are not taking all of their dominant actions and they trade for ci when holding cj (or c-j) 
then they also trade when holding c
-j (or cj). If they trade at { m, c-i } then they do not 
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trade at {cj ,m} or {c-j ,m}. Finally if they trade at {cj ,m} then they trade at {c-j ,m}. Of 
course all these assumptions are made only to the extent they are possible given η. 
These are all fairly transparent, the final issue we must address is the strategies 
of agents who are holding money. We have two options, either we could have them 
calculate pim (f) or we could simply have them assume that with probability one someone 
who is holding money is using a fiat money strategy. The former assumption requires 
them to be able to do complicated calculations, and furthermore would not be that 
different from the latter when εex is small. Thus we will assume that the fraction who 
hold money will first be made up of people who trade at {cj ,m} and then any excess will 
be made up of those who will trade at {c
-j ,m} but not {cj ,m}. Because we assume that 
those who trade for money at either state will trade at both this means that the 
probability someone will trade for m when i is holding cj and c-j is                                
P( T| cj,m)=max {η cj,m - µ, 0}  and P( T| c-j,m) =max { η c-j,m -µ,0} respectively. 
 
With these decisions made we can now focus on our learning algorithm. The 
convergence of our learning algorithm is immediate since εex>0. With this assumption 
our problem is equivalent to the Gauss-Seidel method of value calculation. Thus 
convergence is guaranteed. 
 
Proposition 1: If only one person learns then he will learn all of his strict best 
responses. 
Proof: See the appendix on page 40. 
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By this result, we guarantee individual learning , but as we said above there is no 
guarantee that one person being able to learn implies that society is able to learn. Hence, 
we need a result that leads us to social learning. 
 
Kushner (2005) has worked on games where the population has two agents and 
proved that the Gauss-Seidel algorithm converges to a steady state, but it is unclear if 
these results apply to our environment. Thus here we address the simpler problem of 
showing that in this game the population learns. 
 
Proposition 2: There is an I such that if I ≥ I
_
  society almost surely converges to an 
equilibrium. 
Proof: See the appendix on page 41. 
 
By this proposition we show that if we have enough people to trade with and 
agent can learn their strict best responses, population can learn its best response. Notice 
that this proposition would be simpler if agents knew the current distribution of 
strategies. In that case we could have all of one group trade for money, and at the 
current distribution either a fiat or barter strategy would be a best response. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EVOLUTION 
 
 
We now will show when evolution will result in a society using fiat money. The 
first step of our analysis is to find the radii of our equilibria. Notice that in our model we 
do not only need to know what strategies people are using but what their strengths are. 
However as εm → 0 if a society is in a limit set they will be there for a long time, thus 
their strengths will be nearly equal to the true values. 
 
Lemma 5: ∀I ∃εex > 0 such that if εex ≤ ε˜ex then r∗(F)=(1− pic (F))(1 − µ) and 
r∗(B)=(1− µ) pic(F˜)+ µ, and if pi∗ is a mixed population equilibrium r∗(pi∗) =limξ→01/I. 
Proof: See the appendix on page 43. 
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As one can see if the population size is large, mixed population equilibrium is 
hard to observe in the society, unless each agent in the population is convinced to use it. 
Otherwise, if there is more than one agent who is willing to use some other equilibrium, 
society will be out of equilibrium, and result in either monetary equilibrium or in barter 
equilibrium. 
  
Note that this is one of the key results of this paper. We stated security levels for 
the barter, monetary and mixed equilibria. In other words, we specify critical mass of 
agents to change the equilibrium from one to another. For example, a fraction of 
population which is less than r∗(F), does not effect the state of the world. However, if 
there is a fraction grater than r∗(F) is willing to use barter trading, then new equilibrium 
for the whole population becomes barter equilibrium. As a result, the system does not 
rest in any state and it switches between these equilibria stated in the lemma. We can 
note that this is due to the ergodicity of our model, i.e. each agent may try out of 
equilibrium path by learning and by mutations. 
 
Further, our learning based evolutionary algorithm give place for switching 
between equilibria. We show that society may switch barter equilibrium whenever there 
is enough fraction who wants to switch from monetary equilibrium or it may switch to 
monetary equilibrium while using barter equilibrium given that there is enough fraction 
who is willing to use money. 
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Also, one can see that if we are interested in the rise of fiat money then we have 
made the worst assumption about how agents estimate the fraction of people holding 
money and using the fiat money strategy. We have assumed that they always over 
estimate the fraction using the fiat money strategy, if we required them to calculate the 
correct probability or believe that strategy and the good being held were independent 
this would make the transition from barter to fiat money easier. Secondly, notice that 
r∗(F) and r∗(B) are determined by the fraction of agents holding money and by the 
fraction of the population who uses fiat money strategy while holding the consumption 
good, namely pic(f),f Є{ F, F~}. 
 
Thirdly, from lemma 3 limεex→0 pic*(F)≈ pic*( F~)≈ x. Using simple algebra, one 
can easily find r∗(F)  > r∗(B) , and by the definition of the security level in the long run 
monetary equilibrium is more stable than barter equilibrium, since the least fraction of 
the population that must switch their strategy from monetary equilibrium is greater than 
the fraction for the barter equilibrium. In other words, in our model if society learns to 
use money, then we expect that society will use monetary trading most of the time, 
since to switch from monetary equilibrium we need more agents than to switch from 
barter equilibrium.  
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Figure 5.1 Switching between monetary and barter equilibrium 
 
Before we state our final result, we should note that these results reveal the 
consistency of our model with the history since even in complex economies there is a 
place for barter trading and historically agents sometimes utilize barter even they use 
money as a medium of exchange. 
Now, the final result can be explained very succinctly. The most interesting case 
is when εex is nearly zero and the society is complex---x is nearly zero---or it is hard to 
find someone who wants to trade with you. In this case the only important parameter is 
µ, and if µ<1/2 then fiat money will be evolutionarily dominant or stochastically stable. 
 
Theorem 1: If I ≥ I and εex ≤ε--ex and there is less money than goods (µ < 1/2) then in 
complex societies non-convertible fiat money is stochastically stable when εex  is nearly 
zero. More generally this is true when: 
 
where                                          
Proof: See the appendix on page 45.  
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Notice that agents using the fiat money strategy do barter if the opportunity arises. We 
should point out that this occurs even today, while the majority of trades use money 
people do not turn down the opportunity to barter. In our model agents rarely use barter 
in complex societies. The general formula for the probability that a trade uses money in 
the fiat money equilibrium is  
2µ/[2µ+ x2 (1 − µ)]     (3) 
One simple model of x is that it is the inverse of the number of goods an agent 
consumes, thus in a modern economy x=1/1000 would be conservative. If this is so and 
µ ≥1/20 then more than 99% of trades will use fiat money. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
It has long been wondered how non-convertible fiat money came to be trusted. 
We all recognize the optimality of money, this has been explained in many frameworks 
and many different models. The question is how people came to trust a worthless piece 
of paper, enough that they would give up real goods for these wooden nickels. We show 
that in complex economies as long as the market is not flooded with this worthless 
currency people will learn to trust it. 
 
In fact the most surprising fact, given our analysis, is that non-convertible fiat 
money has taken so long to arise. As Dowd (2001) points out fiat money has never 
arisen in a barter economy historically. It has always been preceded by commodity 
money---with gold being the primary example, then by fractionally based commodity 
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money, and then pure fiat money has only arisen through government fiat---hence the 
name. 
Thus while our results show that fiat money can arise they do not show how fiat 
money did arise historically. To understand this issue we first need a tractable and 
reasonable model where all four different strategies could be equilibria. Right now there 
is no paper that includes all four equilibria in a tractable model. Iwai (2001) analyzes a 
model with all of the relevant equilibria, but the equilibria depend on the distribution of 
agents' types and thus would not be suitable for analysis. Selgin (2003) has a tractable 
model with fiat money, commodity money, and barter as possible strategies but that 
model does not have a barter equilibrium. 
There are several issues that would need to be addressed in the final version of 
such a model. One issue that Dowd (2001) raises and our model does not address is how 
do people choose between currencies? We believe that it is uncommon in history that 
multiple currencies are accepted---early United States history being a counter example. 
Why is this? One part of this analysis should include exchange rates, and for that we 
would need to have divisible goods and currency as in Green and Zhou (2002). Another 
line of analysis is looking at the incentives of the party issuing the currency. In our 
model the stock of currency is a given, but in Ritter (1995) this depends on the 
incentives of the issuing body. Our results here would require that this body represents a 
significant fraction of the population. We hope that the our basic results add to the 
understanding of this issue, and that with further analysis we can develop a complete 
understanding of the rise of money. 
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APPENDIX: 
 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
 
If i trades at {c
−j, c−i} and j trades with probability ηj . > 0 the trade will take 
place with probability (1 − εex) ηj. . If i does not trade then the trade will take place with 
probability εexηj . < (1 − εex) ηj . . Thus trading is not optimal since it gives an 
instantaneous loss of κ and in the next period has the same continuation value as not 
trading. The same argument also explains not trading at {cj, c−i} and inverting the 
argument explains trading at {cj, ci} and {c−j, ci}. 
 
Now consider not trading at {m, ci}. To clarify the following argument given a 
strategy σ let the value of holding a unit of money between periods be V (m|σ), and V 
(c|σ) be the value of holding a unit of a consumption good. Assume that i meets 
someone with a unit of ci, then if i trades they get U + βV (c|σ) if they do not trade then 
they get 0+βV (m|σ). The proof will be done when we establish upper bounds for V 
(m|σ). 
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If the strategy calls for trading at {m, c
-i} then by optimality we know that −κ + 
βV (c|σ) ≥ 0+βV (m|σ) and we are done. Thus the strategy must require no trading at {m, 
c
-i} and {m, ci}. 
 
If εex = 0 then V (m|σ) = 0 < U + βV (c|σ) since V (c|σ) ≥ 0 by optimality. Thus 
if there is a εex such that 0 + βV (m|σ) > U + βV (c|σ). V (m|σ) must be increasing in εex. 
But 
V(m|σ) =(1− (1 − µ) εex) (0+βV (m|σ)) + (1 − µ) εex (xU − (1 − x) κ + βV (c|σ))         (4) 
∂V (m|σ)/∂ εex = (1− µ) ((xU − (1 − x) κ + βV (c|σ)) − (0 + βV (m|σ))) 
and ∂V (m|σ)/∂ εex ≤ 0 when xU − (1 − x) κ + βV (c|σ) ≤ 0 + βV (m|σ), thus the highest    
0 + βV(m|σ) can be is xU − (1 − x) κ + βV (c|σ) which is strictly less than U + βV (c|σ). 
Therefore for all εex, U + βV (c|σ) > 0 + βV (m|σ). 
 
Proof of Lemma 3. 
 
In order for the F strategy to be a best response we need that: 
V (m|F) ≥ V (c|F)                              (5) 
or 
(P
 ci (m) − P ci (c))U ≥ (P c−i (m) − Pc−i (c))κ                                     (6) 
and this requires that: 
 (1 − µ) (1 − εex) x (1 − x) (1 − 2 εex)U ≥ −(1 − µ) (1 − x) x εex (1 − 2 εex) κ                (7) 
since the right hand side is negative this will be true as long as εex < 1/2. In order for B˜ 
to be a best response we need that: 
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(Pci (c) − Pci (m))U ≥ (Pc−i (c) − Pc−i (m))κ    (8) 
(1 − µ) (1 − εex) x2 (1 − 2 εex)U ≥ (1 − µ) (1 − x) x εex (1 − 2 εex) κ 
and this requires that εex < min{1/2, xU/(xU+(1−x)κ)} in order for B to be a best 
response we also need that: 
βV (m) ≤ −κ + βV (c)      (9) 
or 
(Pc−i (c) +(1 − β)/β+ Pci (m) + Pm (c))κ ≤ (Pci (c) − Pci (m))U  (10) 
 
If εex = 0 and β > κ/[(1−µ)x2U+κ] one can easily show this is true. One can also 
show that the left hand side is increasing in εex and the right hand side is decreasing and 
that when εex = 1/2 the right hand side is zero and the left hand side positive. Thus there 
is a maximal εex for each β such that this holds, and this is the ε*ex in the statement of the 
lemma. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4.  
 
In a mixed population equilibrium one can show that: 
Pci (m)U − Pc−i (m) κ = Pci (c)U − Pc−i (c) κ  (Mixed Pop. Condition) 
After solving for the probabilities and substitution this gives us: 
pic (f) = x + (1 − x) κεex{[(α (f) − εex) pim (f)]/(1 − 2 εex)-x}/ (1 − εex) xU  (11) 
where α(F) = (1− εex), α(F )˜ = εex. Note that from this equation we can see that              
pic(F) = pic(F )˜ + [εex(1−x)κ pim (F)]/[(1− εex)xU], and that pic(F )˜ is independent of 
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pim(F )˜, thus we know that pic (F) < pic (F )˜. The equation equalizing the inflow and 
outflow of players in the money state is: 
pim(f)(1 −pic(f))(x (1−εex) εex+(1− x)ε2ex)= pic(f)(1−pim(f))[x(1 − εex)2+(1 − x)εex α (f)]   
(12) 
(oio (εex |f) pim(f))/(1 − pim(f)) = pic(f)/(1 − pic(f)) 
and after manipulation these are equivalent to the conditions in Lemma 4. 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
 
The proof is done when we rewrite our algorithm so that it is transparently a 
Gauss-Seidel learning algorithm. To do this choose any arbitrary sequence over Ω and 
any arbitrary sequence over A for each Ω, being sure that the last action pair is {T,T}, 
since εex> 0 this sequence has strictly positive probability. Then note that since others 
are not changing their strategy Mt = M (σi) where σi is this player’s strategy. Then we 
can rewrite our formula for St+1αω as: 
Stαω = (1− τ ) St-1αω + τ [Uαω + β Mαω (σi) St-1]               (13) 
Stαω = τ Uαω + Dαω (σi) St-1 
where 
D(σi) = (1 − τ ) I|A|∗|Ω| + τ βM (σi)     (14) 
(IZ is an identity matrix with Z rows) and our agent chooses ai (ω) as 
ai (ω) ∈ arg maxαi∈{T,N}Eαj [Stαiαjωi]     (15) 
combining these two facts we can write: 
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Skω= max αi∈{T,N} Eαj [τUαiαjω+ D(σi (αi)) St−1]   (16) 
 
where  where σi(αi) reflects the dependence of σi on the player 
choosing αi at state ω. As Kushner (2005) shows since ΣjDij = (1 − τ)+τ β < 1 the 
vector {Skω}ω∈Ω converges to the optimal value function, thus our {Stαω}αω ∈A×Ω converges 
to the true values of the optimal strategies. (Note that the strategy will converge in finite 
time. Once the strategy converges we can ignore the σi in equation (13) then we can be 
sure that the {Stαω}αω ∈A×Ω converge to their true value.) 
 
Convergence to the optimal strategy will happen in finite time on this sequence. 
Let ζ > 0 be the least difference in continuation values for actions that have a strict best 
response. Then since the strengths converge to the true values there is a finite T such 
that the difference between all optimal values and the current strengths are strictly less 
than 1/2 ζ and will be forever after. At this point the player will be using the optimal 
strategy. 
 
Since T is finite this subsequence is finite and in each period a player has a 
strictly positive probability of entering it. Thus a player learns almost surely. 
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Proof of Proposition 2. 
 
Choose I large enough so that if a player’s best response is not independent of 
what four other are doing then there are at least four people who are trading at {cj,m} 
and four people who are not. 
Notice that in order to implement Proposition 1 we need to have a group of two 
people who are holding money and two people who are holding a consumption good. 
For this Proposition we also need them to be using the right strategies. 
 
If the best response of any player is independent of what four people are doing 
then we can choose the group at random, being sure that as many as possible are not 
best responding at the state {cj,m}. Otherwise we need the four people in the group to all 
not be best responding at the state {cj,m}. 
 
To achieve a group of this sort implement a finite sequence of trades so that 
there are two groups–one of whom is trading at {cj,m} and one of whom is not. If this is 
not possible in a finite number of trades then everyone must be either trading or not at 
{cj,m} and we are done, thus assume that it is possible. Therefore without loss of 
generality select the group that is not best responding at {cj,m}. 
 
Have the people in the group go into a finite subsequence as specified in 
Proposition 1, at the end of this subsequence all players in the group will have learned 
to best respond at all states. While this group is in this subsequence have everyone not 
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in this group be in matches that either reinforce dominant actions or involve trading 
money. 
 
At this point everyone’s best response will be independent of what four people 
do, thus we can form a random group of four with as many non-best responders as 
possible and repeat this process. By iteration we can be sure everyone will best respond, 
and then we can have everyone learn one final time so that their value functions will 
coincide with the fact that everyone is now using a best response. 
 
Proof of Lemma 5. 
 
We first note that if we are in a mixed population equilibrium we can have one 
person switch to either F or B  ˜and then we can use Proposition 2 to converge to either 
the F or B equilibrium. 
First notice that if all players are using the B strategy that for all λ > 0 and κ > 0 
there is a εm > 0 such that if the probability of a mutation is less than this εm, P([St − 
V(B)] < κ) > 1− λ for all people in the society. This is an immediate implication of 
Proposition 1 and the fact that mutations only occur with probability εm. Thus we can 
assume all people are using the strategy B and that [St − V (B)] < κ, where the value of 
κ will depend on the population size and be selected below. 
 
Then clearly if  people mutate to the F  ˜ strategy 
then this is sufficient by Proposition 2. Therefore assume, in contradiction, that less 
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than                                        people mutate. We will show that behavior will return to 
all people using B. 
Clearly the most difficult case will be when mutants do not learn their true values, so 
have them either trade using dominant actions or trade money. Furthermore it will be 
insufficient if someone using the B strategy switches to the B  ˜strategy, so what we must 
show is that there is no sequence where someone using the strategy B  ˜will switch to F .˜ 
 
Now assume that − 1 people mutate to the F  ˜
strategy. Then we know that since I is discrete V(c|B )˜− V(m|F )˜≥ 2κ > 0 for all εex. Let 
this be the κ we used above. Notice as well that in this case the value of every strength 
will increase since when some people are using the F  ˜ strategy this increases the value 
of money. This means that for all {αω} Stαω − S*αω is negative, thus every time {αω} is 
updated Stαω − S*αω will be negative, or all strengths will approach their new limit from 
below. 
 
What we must show is that trading at the states {cj,m} and {c-j,m} is not optimal 
for someone who is using the B strategy. Now for someone using the B strategy the 
initial value of the strengths {St{N,T}{cj,m}, St{N,N}{cj,m}, St{T,N}{cj,m}} are all at least 
[(1−εex)(1−µ)βx2U]/(1−β)+εexβZ1(εex)−κ where Z1(εex) is a function such that 
limεex→0Z1(εex)=0. As well given the new distribution of strategies V(c|B )˜= 
[(1−εex)(1−µ)x2U]/(1−β)+εexZ2(εex) where limεex→0Z2(εex)= Z2> 0. Since 
V(c|F )˜≤V(c|B )˜−2κ≤ [(1−εex)(1−µ)x2U]/(1−β)+εexZ2(εex)− κ and the limiting value 
of St{N,T}{cj,m} is β V(m|F )˜ there clearly is a ε˜ ex such that 
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[(1−ε˜ ex)(1−µ)βx2U]/(1−β)+ε˜ exβZ2(ε˜ ex)− βκ <[(1−ε˜ ex)(1−µ)βx2U]/(1−β)+ε˜ exβZ1(ε˜ ex)  (17) 
ε˜ ex (Z2(ε˜ ex) − Z1(ε˜ ex)) < κ 
and if this is true then even if St{N,T}{cj,m} is at it’s initial value and St{T,T}{cj,m} increases to 
it’s limiting value it will still be true that St{T,T}{cj,m}< St{N,T}{cj,m}. 
Thus all people will choose either the strategy B or B˜ even if the learning 
process favors the strategy F˜. This argument is clearly reversible because the only 
difference between B˜ and F˜ is whether you trade at the state {cjm}. Note that if people 
are using F instead of F˜ this only has an impact on order of εex, thus for small enough 
εex the statement is correct. 
 
 
Proof of Theorem 1.  
 
From Young (1993) we know that a limit set (equilibrium in this game) is 
stochastically stable if it has the minimum stochastic potential. From Hasker (2004) we 
know that the 
stochastic potential of an equilibrium σ∗ is: 
c∗σ∗ = c∗ (E) − r∗ (σ∗) + ca(σ∗)    (18) 
where E is the emergent seed and ca (·) is the core attraction rate. Notice that in order to 
find the stochastically stable strategy we do not actually need to find the emergent seed 
(which we will not), and we will show that for the relevant equilibria ca (σ∗) ≤ 1/I . 
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First we will dispatch with the possibility that a mixed population equilibrium 
could be stochastically stable. Assume to the contrary that pi∗ has the lowest stochastic 
potential, notice that we can transition from the pi∗equilibrium to F with only one 
mutation, this means that: 
c∗F ≤ c∗pi∗ +1/I − r∗(F)      (19) 
 
and clearly this is negative for reasonable I. 
 
Now the core attraction rate is the number of mutations to get from the core to 
the given strategy. The core must contain more than one limit set thus it either contains 
both F and B or it contains a mixed strategy equilibrium. This tells us that the maximum 
of the core attraction rate is 1/I as claimed above. 
 
Given this F must be stochastically stable if: 
 
which will be true for large enough I if (1−pic(F))(1−µ)>(1−µ)pic(F˜)+µ, which is the 
condition above. 
 
 
 
 
